| Abstract: | Because of its costliness, military mobilization is generally seen as a mechanism by which high-resolve leaders can credibly signal their high resolve in international crises, thereby possibly overcoming informational asymmetries that can lead to costly and inefficient war. I examine how power-shifts caused by mobilization within a crisis can lead to commitment-problem wars. In a simple ultimatum-offer crisis bargaining model of complete information, war occurs if and only if the power-shift caused by mobilization exceeds the bargaining surplus, which is Powell's (2004 Powell, Robert. 2004. The Inefficient Use of Power. American Political Science Review, 98 May: 231–241. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2006 Powell, Robert. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization, 60(1): 169–203. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) general inefficiency condition for commitment-problem wars. When private information is added, and hence mobilization potentially has a stabilizing signaling role, under certain conditions the commitment problem overwhelms the signaling role and mobilization leads to certain war. Finally, I analyze an infinite-horizon model that captures the reality that mobilizing takes time, and find that commitment-problem wars occur under broader conditions than the general inefficiency condition implies. |
