Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game |
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Authors: | Farmer Amy Pecorino Paul |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, U.S.A 2. Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, Box 870224, Tuscaloosa, AL, 35487, U.S.A
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Abstract: | Legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of rent-seeking contest. In civil litigation there is a natural interaction between the objective merits of the case and the outcome of the contest. Institutions such as fee shifting do not generally have a counterpart in other rent-seeking contests. The endogenous decision to participate in the rent-seeking contest corresponds to the decision by the plaintiff to bring a case, and the decision by the defendant to defend it. The desirability of fee shifting is very sensitive to the value of the parameter which describes the legal technology. |
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