The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems |
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Authors: | Costas Panagopoulos |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science, Fordham University, 441 E. Fordham Rd. Faber 667, Bronx, NY 10458, USA |
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Abstract: | Compulsory voting laws have consistently been demonstrated to boost electoral participation. Despite the widespread presence
of compulsory voting and the significant impact these laws appear to have on voting behavior, surprisingly little effort has
been devoted to analyzing how mandatory voting alters the decision-making calculus of individual voters in these systems.
Moreover, studies that investigate the influence of compulsory voting laws on electoral participation generally treat these
policies monolithically, with scant attention to the nuances that differentiate mandatory voting laws across systems and to
their consequences for voting rates. Analyses that explicitly and empirically examine the effects of penalties and enforcement
are surprisingly rare. This study aims to fill that void by adapting rational choice models of participation in elections
for compulsory voting systems. I find that the level of penalties countries impose for non-compliance and the degree of penalty
enforcement impact turnout rates. Voters in mandatory voting systems abstain least when both the penalties and the likelihood
of enforcement are high, and abstain most when both meaningless.
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Keywords: | Compulsory voting Voting behavior Voting costs and benefits Voter turnout Comparative elections |
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