The growing challenges of providing pensions to state and local civil servants in an aging society

Much hope has been placed in the ability of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) to enhance public accountability. SAIs' independence and professionalism lend promise to the chance that they might succeed where program budgeting, program evaluation, performance measurement and strengthened legislative oversight have failed. Little attention has been paid in the literature to political and organizational constraints on the ability of SAIs to enhance public accountability. The article examines the contribution of Israel's State Comptroller to enhanced accountability across three measures: audit coverage; type of audit coverage; and use of audit reports by the Knesset (Israel's parliament). Programs connected with crisis situations, large programs and direct provision programs are found to receive significantly more audit attention. The Comptroller conducted few audits of program effectiveness. The few reports used by the Knesset were almost all connected with crisis situations. Exploration of the reasons for these patterns reveals that: organizational politics considerations limit the willingness of state auditors to conduct effectiveness audits and relate to controversial issues; logistical and political considerations of Members of Knesset limit their interest in using audit reports; and the paucity of audit resources relative to the scope of government means that much activity is not scrutinized.