| Abstract: | A utility-maximizing model of judicial behavior predicts that,all else equal, judges who have stronger preferences for publishingopinions, who have lighter workloads, or who are able to writepublishable decisions more efficiently are more likely to publishtheir decisions. Using federal district court judges' decisionsregarding the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,this article presents empirical support for these predictions.Many judicial, institutional, and other characteristics areexamined that should be correlated with a judge's workload orwith a judge's taste for, or efficiency in, publishing opinions.These analyses find that, all else equal, judges who held priorpolitical positions, who received higher American Bar Association(ABA) ratings, who had lighter caseloads, who had longer tenures,who struck down the guidelines, or who had a greater chanceof promotion to a U.S. court of appeals were more likely topublish their decisions. In addition, judges' publication decisionswere significantly affected by the prior decisions of judgesin the same district, but little affected by those of judgesin other districts. |
