Restructuring the Empire: The Nixon Doctrine after Vietnam

Abstract

Ever since Richard Nixon announced that the United States would adopt a “low profile” defense posture in Asia, American foreign affairs analysts have sought to construct an accurate model of the new policy. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who analyzed the Nixon Doctrine in a 1969 report to the Congress, concluded that henceforth “The United States will avoid the creation of situations in which there is such dependence on us that, inevitably, we become enmeshed in what are essentially Asian problems and conflicts.” Lest this conclusion alarm any of our more insecure clients in the area, Vice President Agnew toured Asia in early 1970 to announce that the President had never intended such a sweeping reversal of policy: “Let me make it very clear,” he told newsmen in Canberra, “that despite a great deal of speculation and rumor, we are not withdrawing from Asia and the Pacific…. As a Pacific power, we will remain in the Pacific.” Nixon himself seems to have encouraged this dichotomy: thus the invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and the massive air attacks on Hanoi in 1972 suggested that he was committed to the interventionist stance represented by Agnew; while the cease-fire in Vietnam and the initiation of diplomatic contacts with China suggest that he leans toward the more restrained position of Mansfield.