| Abstract: | The Access Charge Plan, a marginal-cost pricing system for long-distance telephone sewice, was devised by the Federal Communications Commission in 1982 to facilitate the transition from regulated monopoly to competition. In little more than a year after the plan was proposed, as the plan's distributive and competitive impacts were recognized by a host of stakeholders and political interests, a flood of opposition different from the system that had previously existed, nevertheless continued to reflect some of the objectives of the past regime, including subsidies to residential users and some shelter for AT&T's principal competitors. The strength of the political process that produced these modifications was due part to elements in the original FCC proposal that were not essential to its central purpose. swamped the initiative. What emerged, although distinctly different from the system that had previously existed, nevertheless continued to reflect some of the objectives of the past regime, including subsidies to residential users and some shelter for AT&T's principal competitors. The strength of the political process that produced these modifications was due part to elements in the original FCC proposal that were not essential to its central purpose. |
