| Abstract: | The question of the possibility of an anti-foundationalist approach to ethics has come to the forefront in recent discussions in the humanities. Two questions dominate these discussions. The first is how we can define agency, the necessary ground of ethical action apart from a transcendental subject. The second is how we can define a secure foundation for ethical judgements without universals. A relativistic ethics seems, by definition, futile. I take up both of these questions here with reference to the work of Judith Butler. I argue that in her post-Gender Trouble work Butler has defined an agent, an ‘I’, that is neither a social dupe nor a transcendental subject but, rather, both discursive and material. This ‘I’ provides the basis for Butler's turn to ontology as well as her analyses of vulnerability, precarity and cohabitation. These conceptions form the basis of her ethical position. I examine Butler's central argument that the material/ontological facts of human life necessitate the equal treatment of all human beings. In conclusion, I question whether Butler's position provides a sufficient basis for an antifoundational ethics. I argue that Butler is headed in the right direction but has not yet achieved her goal. |
