Insincere voting under the successive procedure |
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Authors: | Bjørn Erik Rasch |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1097, Blindern, 0317, Oslo, Norway
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Abstract: | Most European parliaments use the successive procedure to reach decisions. This means that a parliament votes feasible alternatives one-by-one in a pre-determined order until one of them obtains a majority of votes. The paper has two objectives. First, I sketch a simple method making it easy to uncover instances of successful insincere voting under the successive procedure. Second, by focusing on data from one national assembly consistently using this procedure, I demonstrate that insincere or strategic voting is very rare. The finding does not indicate that politicians necessarily behave in a non-strategic or unsophisticated manner. It means only that strategic maneuvers may take place at earlier stages of the decision-making process, for example, in designing the voting agenda. |
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