The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now

Back in the early 1990s, Colombia reintegrated five left-wing guerrilla groups. Whether as groups or individuals, these guerrillas found space for legitimate political participation at the local and national levels. Society accepted them and they embraced democracy and contributed to the strengthening of liberal political ideas and human rights norms in the country. Fifteen years later Colombia is once again attempting to reintegrate ex-combatants, 33,000 from the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, the so-called ‘paramilitary’—a right-wing force that sought to fight guerrillas—and about 11,000 ‘individually demobilised’ combatants of FARC, ELN and AUC who have since 2002 deserted their group. This time, however, the task of transforming illegal armed groups into legitimate political entities is proving to be harder. In particular, the reintegration of the paramilitary has elicited wide criticism from Colombians and the international community. Why are things different today? By examining and comparing the processes of political reintegration of the M-19 and the paramilitary this article will argue that there are at least four critical factors that either allow or bar former combatants from becoming legitimate players with a capacity for political interlocution: the international and domestic political and normative contexts; the nature and behaviour of the illegal armed group (how much power they command, to what extent groups use war for personal profit and whether they commit egregious crimes); the terms of the peace negotiation; and the practical dimensions of exercising political interlocution.