| Abstract: | The proliferation of threats to security, which emerge in states going through major reform processes, demands a functional intelligence architecture. Accurate intelligence is essential in identifying risks to the wider reform process. Western intelligence agencies have viewed intelligence services in reforming states as tactical opportunities and sources of intelligence rather than as targets for reform in the context of a wider reform agenda. Sensitivities inherent in intelligence gathering in states with a recent history of repressive government make the relationship between the intelligence services and civil society crucial if the intelligence services are to be effective and to play a positive role in the transition process. The practice of countering terrorism has altered the nature of intelligence gathering in ways that make accountability and public legitimacy more central to the effectiveness of intelligence services than the ‘traditional’ threats did. Western models of intelligence oversight and accountability are inadequate in states without developed traditions of democratic governance and weaknesses in wider political culture means that these models are not effective in lending intelligence services popular legitimacy. Alternative models for structuring the relationship between the intelligence services, parliament, the executive and the public must therefore be identified. |
