The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms |
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Authors: | Morten Bennedsen Kasper Meisner Nielsen |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School and Centre for Economic and Business Research, Denmark;(2) Centre for Economic and Business Research and Centre for Applied Microeconometrics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark |
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Abstract: | We analyze the impact of a 75 pct. Break-Through rule on 1,035 European firms with dual class shares. In 3–5 pct. of the firms the controlling owners incur a direct loss of control, while in another 11–17 pct. of the firms, the controlling owners are likely to incur a loss of control. Firms in Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries are more likely to incur a loss of control. The restrictions that the Break-Through rule put on the ability of these firms to issue new shares to outsiders without changing the control structure are also estimated. We conclude that a significant number of firms with dual class shares in the European Union will be affected by a 75 pct. Break-Through rule. |
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Keywords: | takeover regulation corporate governance European Union Break-Through rule corporate law dual class shares |
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