Continuity or Change in Interstate Extradition? Assessing Puerto Rico v. Branstad

Interstate extradition law would appear radically altered bythe 1987 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Puerto Rico v. Branstad,overturning a precedent established in Kentucky v. Dennison126 years earlier that extradition could not be legally compelledby the federal government. Dennison, however, is more complexthan is commonly believed, and the demise of one of Dennison'sconclusions does not signal a major overhaul of the SupremeCourt's treatment of extradition. Rather, the Court's decisionshave adhered closely to the original intent of the Constitution'sextradition clause. The part of Dennison overturned was thereforenoteworthy as an exception to the general thrust of the Court'streatment of extradition. How then did Dennison's bar of legallycompelled extradition survive so long when the theory of federalismsupporting the decision had been repudiated long before it wasreversed? This article explores this question and directs attentionto the consequences of Branstad for extradition. Despite theapparent clarity of Branstad, a survey of state extraditionofficers reveals lingering confusion over extradition law.