Ambient Intelligence, Criminal Liability and Democracy |
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Authors: | Mireille Hildebrandt |
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Institution: | (1) Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands;(2) Faculteit Rechten en Criminologie, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, Brussel, 1050, Belgium |
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Abstract: | In this contribution we will explore some of the implications of the vision of Ambient Intelligence (AmI) for law and legal
philosophy. AmI creates an environment that monitors and anticipates human behaviour with the aim of customised adaptation
of the environment to a person’s inferred preferences. Such an environment depends on distributed human and non-human intelligence
that raises a host of unsettling questions around causality, subjectivity, agency and (criminal) liability. After discussing
the vision of AmI we will present relevant research in the field of philosophy of technology, inspired by the post-phenomenological
position taken by Don Ihde and the constructivist realism of Bruno Latour. We will posit the need to conceptualise technological
normativity in comparison with legal normativity, claiming that this is necessary to develop democratic accountability for
the implications of emerging technologies like AmI. Lastly we will investigate to what extent technological devices and infrastructures
can and should be used to achieve compliance with the criminal law, and we will discuss some of the implications of non-human
distributed intelligence for criminal liability.
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Keywords: | Criminal liability Agency Distributed intelligence Ambient intelligence Democracy Rule of law Causality |
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