| Abstract: | Some philosophers argue that the state and its citizens stand in a morally privileged position vis-à-vis one another, but not towards other states or citizens. However, many of those people, particularly philosophical liberals, also hold that morally insignificant differences, such as place of birth, sex or ethnicity, should not affect rights, liberties and life prospects. On the face of it, these two sets of ideas appear incompatible and point to a conflict in some liberal thought. Liberal philosophers, like John Rawls, have attempted to reconcile these conflicting ideas. His attempt has attracted a great deal of criticism, especially from those liberals attracted to a more cosmopolitan point of view. In this article, we use Aristotelian virtue ethics as the basis upon which to reconcile liberalism and patriotism. We argue that the state should be understood as an agent that stands in a special relationship to its citizens (of philia ). The state's virtue depends, in part, on it giving those citizens preferential treatment with regard to justice compared to citizens of other countries. Similarly, if citizens are to be just in their relations with their own state, they must behave in special ways towards that state as compared to other states. Certain forms of justice only arise in relationships of particular kinds. |
