公有企业的治理结构 --20世纪中国改革经验研究

当我国经济学界引进“公司治理结构”、“委托—代理”等概念解释中国的企业制度改革时,遇到的基本障碍之一是:现代市场经济条件下严格意义上的“委托—代理”理论并不完全适用于中国大多数公有企业。因为这一理论最基本的假定是存在着一个真正的所有者,这个所有者愿意并有能力约束代理人,以防止自身权益的流失。但是,如果找不到这样的所有者,那么讨论“委托—代理”的问题似乎就没有多少意义。

Administrative Structure of State-Owned Enterprises --On the experience of Chinese reform in the 20th century

When Chinese economists introduce the terms of "administration structure of companies" and "trust-agency" to explain the restructuring of enterprises,they meet with an essential obstacle: the strict "trust-agency" theory in contemporary market economy does not apply to most Chinese SOEs because its fundamental supposition is the existence of a real owner,who is willing and capable to constrain the agent in case his benefits might lose.Without this owner,it will be meaningless to discuss the issue of "trust-agency".