Japan and two theories of military doctrine formation: civilian policymakers, policy preference, and the 1976 National Defense Program Outline

Using hitherto underutilized Japanese material, this paper systematicallyanalyzes two competing theories of military doctrine formation thataccount for the construction of the 1976 National Defense ProgramOutline (NDPO), postwar Japan’s first military doctrine.It demonstrates that, on balance, available evidence on thepolicy preference of two key civilian policymakers, Michio Sakataand Takuya Kubo, is more consistent with the interpretationdrawn from Posen’s balance-of-power theory than with thatfrom Kier’s domestic culturalist theory. While by no means ignoredby these policymakers, domestic political concerns neither dominantly shaped,nor gave a specific direction to their policy action. Rather,the policymakers were motivated to formulate the best responsepossible to Japan’s new international strategic conditions.This finding relates the hitherto neglected significance ofthe NDPO case to the larger, ongoing realist–constructivistdebate on the formation of military doctrine. It also leadsus to a more sophisticated understanding of NDPO formation,which focuses on the process of how a combination of politicalleadership and ideas triggered the breakthrough in Japanesesecurity policymaking.