Asymmetric partisan advantage and limited strategic calculation: Why Republican challengers appear unresponsive to national partisan trend

The notion that electorally experienced House challengers are guided by estimates of electoral prospects' influence on their probability of victory is now familiar (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; Jacobson, 1987, 1989, 1990). Recently, Jacobson (1989, 1990) also uncovered a puzzling asymmetry in strategic behavior: experienced Democratic challengers are responsive to national performance indicators, but not Republican. It seems, however, highly unlikely that strategic behavior is asymmetric. I assume the increase national partisan trend gives to a candidate's electoral prospects is tied to district competitiveness; therefore, any competitive advantage should result in a greater boost in the electoral prospects for the advantaged party. It follows that a lopsided reward for partisan trend should also offer a greater incentive for electorally experienced candidates of the advantaged party to challenge House incumbents. I test, and the findings support, the hypothesis that Democrats enjoy this advantage. The results offer strong circumstantial evidence for the explanation of Jacobson's puzzle.