| Abstract: | The dramatic and surprising process of democratization in Eastern Europe poses a challenge to political science. There is a demand for theories which may help us to understand these transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. This article is primarily focused on that set of hypotheses which are found in Adam Przeworski's writings on liberalization and democratization. Its main purpose is to develop some proposals for a game theoretical interpretation of Przeworski's ideas. At the outset this seems to be foredoomed to failure, since in some cases - i. e. the collapse of communism in East Germany and Czechoslovakia -the process of democratization was turbulent to the extent that even the characteristics of a game were the subject of dramatic changes. One may then ask if it is at all possible to model these processes as a game, i. e. a situation where the actors, their opportunity sets and their payoffs are well defined? In lieu of a conclusion the article ends with a suggestion that the snowball effect, as observed at the repeated demonstrations in such places as Leipzig and Wenzler Square, can be understood in terms of Granovetter's threshold model of collective action. |
