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A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information |
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| Authors: | Nuno Garoupa Mohamed Jellal |
| Affiliation: | (1) Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032, Lisbon, Portugal;, CEPR, London;(2) Toulouse Business School, 20 Boulevard Lasrosses, BP 7010, 31068 Toulouse, France;(3) GREI, Centre d'études Stratégiques, Université Mohammed V, Rabat, Morocco |
| Abstract: | We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn. |
| Keywords: | fine probability of detection asymmetry of information |
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