| 美国西部港口劳资纠纷之博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 佘云霞. 美国西部港口劳资纠纷之博弈分析[J]. 中国劳动关系学院学报, 2004, 18(3): 48-53 |
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| 作者姓名： | 佘云霞 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国劳动关系学院,公共管理系,北京,100037 |
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| 摘 要： | 博弈论是研究理性的行动者相互作用的理论。本文通过对2002年9-10月间美国西部港口的“封港”事件进行博弈分析,论证了在市场经济国家进行集体谈判的三个假设条件:一是设定谈判的行为体(或主体)是理性的。二是谈判涉及到利益的协调与交换。三是谈判是一种制度化的行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈 劳资纠纷 合作 共同利益 塔夫脱-哈特莱法 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-9096(2004)03-0048-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-03-26 |
A Game Analysis of Labor Disputes in West Ports in the United States |
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| SHE Yun-xia China Institute of Industrial Relations,Beijing ,China. A Game Analysis of Labor Disputes in West Ports in the United States[J]. Journal of China Institute of Industrial Relations, 2004, 18(3): 48-53 |
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| Authors: | SHE Yun-xia China Institute of Industrial Relations Beijing China |
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| Affiliation: | SHE Yun-xia China Institute of Industrial Relations,Beijing 100037,China |
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| Abstract: | Game theory studies mutual roles among rational agents. This article proves three hypotheses about collective bargainingin market economies: firstly, actors of collective bargaining are rational; secondly, collective bargaining relatives with coordinationand exchange of interests of the parties to industrial relations; thirdly, collective bargaining is an action of systematization. |
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| Keywords: | game labar disputes actors cooperation common interests Taft-Hartley Act |
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