Limited information and coordinated voting in multi-party elections under plurality rule: The role of campaigns |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Manchester, UK;2. University of Southampton, UK;3. Simon Fraser University, Canada;4. University of Texas at Austin, USA;1. Department of Government, University of Essex, UK;2. School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, USA;1. Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA;2. Department of Political Science, University of Montreal, C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7, Canada;3. Department of Political Science, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7, Canada;1. Banco de la República (Central Bank of Colombia), Cra. 7 # 14-78 Piso 11, Bogotá, 110111, Colombia;2. Banca de las Oportunidades, Calle 28 # 13A-15 Piso 38, Bogotá, 110111, Colombia |
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| Abstract: | This essay bridges the logic of electoral coordination with the observation that many voters cannot recognize ex post viable candidates. When strategic voting is limited, behavioral factors of sincere voting play a large part in coordinating uninformed voters and inform the expectations of potentially strategic voters about the patterns of voting. Using the 2011 Canadian Election Survey, I found strong effects of the density of campaign contacts and the asymmetries in the campaigns spending and party identification on the predictability of the patterns of intra-district competition. A comparison of the effects of behavioral factors on the uninformed and informed voters confirms that the effect of centrifugal spending and party identification is conditional on the ability of voters to recognize the leaders of district competition. |
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| Keywords: | Coordinated voting Bounded rationality Campaigns 2011 federal election in Canada |
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