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An economic explanation of the nationalization of electoral politics
Affiliation:1. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Barcelona, Spain;2. GEN (University of Vigo), Campus Universitario, Ourense, Spain;1. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman;2. Department of Electrical Engineering, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt;1. Malaysia-Japan International Institute of Technology, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 54100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia;2. Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, 819-0395 Fukuoka, Japan;3. Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi MARA, 40450 Shah Alam, Malaysia;1. Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece;2. Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece;3. Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, 76 Patission Street, GR – 104 34 Athens, Greece
Abstract:The literature on the nationalization of electoral politics focuses on the institutional characteristics of political regimes and the structure and organization of social cleavages. We argue that the nationalization of electoral politics is also driven by economic performance. Economic perturbations increase vote transfers from large (and highly nationalized) parties to small (and weakly nationalized) parties. Permissive electoral systems exacerbate the influence of economic performance on nationalization. Pooled cross-sectional time-series regression analysis is conducted on data from 43 countries and 475 elections between 1950 and 2012. The party-level mechanisms are shown through a closer look at Austria, Portugal and Ireland.
Keywords:Cleavages  Decentralization  Economic voting  Electoral system  Nationalization
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