A willingness to talk: Conciliatory gestures and de-escalation

Conclusion This article points up a lack of any systematic, comparative knowledge about one aspect of the complex process of conflict termination, namely signalling a willingness to talk at the start of termination in such a way that the likelihood of an adversary's recognizing the gesture for what it is (and perhaps responding positively) is maximized. In the absence of systematic analysis, I have suggested a number of plausible working hypotheses about the characteristics of actions that have the best chance of being recognized by an adversary in the midst of conflict as real or genuine. In doing so, I have isolated a number of general principles that could be helpful in explaining why certain actions were successful in starting a process of de-escalation, at least leading to talks about talks, while others were not.I have, thus, focused on the likelihood of successful communication of a credible conciliatory gesture, if this is what a party wishes to convey. Of course, the real world of political conflict gives rise to numerous examples of false conciliatory gestures made for tactical advantage, concessions extracted from a reluctant adversary that will be repudiated once the balance of advantage changes, and de-escalation processes begun purely to obtain a breathing space. However, sorting out the genuinely intended signals from those designed as a ruse or smoke screen does not seem to be an inherently hopeless research task. It is unlikely that the accurate perception of genuine concessions in past conflicts has occurred in a wholly individual or random manner. Our hope, as scholars, must be that systematic empirical analysis will indicate some patterns in this phenomenon, throwing light on the manner in which conflicts begin to terminate, even if this proves only a temporary halt. This article seeks to contribute to such understanding by suggesting a framework within which answers might be sought.Christopher R. Mitchell is Professor of Conflict Resolution and International Relations at George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. 22030. He also serves as Director of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason.Ideas for this article arose originally from work carried out in the Conflict Termination Project in the Department of Systems Science at the City University, London. Sincere thanks are due Dean Pruitt of the State University of New York, Buffalo; Louis Kriesberg of the Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, Syracuse University; Alan Simpson (Visiting Fellow); Shaw Smith (Diplomat in Residence) at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution; and to doctoral students in my class, CONFLICT 751, for helpful comments and criticisms.