Embeddedness and the Articulation of Capital Interests in Norway

This article focuses on organization of capital interests comparatively across sectors and does so by developing an explanatory framework linking organizational patterns to incentives for individual strategies. The key argument is that variations in the political organization of capital interests across sectors, and the linkages between state and capital interests, reflect different degrees of embeddedness. Underlying the embeddedness hypothesis is the notion that the organization of capital can be seen as an alternative to governance through market processes. Organization may replace market governance either by constituting an alternative to internal self-regulation or by channelling regulatory functions through cooperation with public authorities. A set of hypotheses are developed concerning the relationship between degree of embeddedness on the one hand, and organization of capital interest organization and the interface between state-industry, on the other. The overall picture is that we find support for the crux of our argument, but there are important modifications. As for functional differentiation of capital interests we find, in accordance with OUT hypothesis, that highly embedded capital is associated with organizations that have a broad set of functions. Transient capital, on the other hand, has comparatively less stable ties to production systems as well as other social relations, and is thus more difficult to control organizationally. Concerning vertical integration, our hypotheses is only partially supported Looking at the interface between state and economic organizations in the primary sectors and non-embedded sectors such as finance and insurance, we find the data quite in accordance with our hypotheses. Cases with a medium level of embeddedness do not, however, fit our hypotheses as well as the sectors at the two extreme ends.