Regulation by litigation |
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| Authors: | Bruce Yandle Andrew Dorchak Andrew P. Morriss |
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| Affiliation: | 1. John E. Walker Department of Economics (Alumni Distinguished Professor Emeritus and BB&T Scholar), Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA;2. Reference and Foreign/International Law Specialist, Law School Library, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA;3. D. Paul Jones, Jr. & Charlene Angelich Jones Chairholder of Law, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA |
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| Abstract: | We believe that careful application of the logic of economics and public choice shines important light on regulation through litigation and can explain at least partly why regulators choose the litigation route, when they choose it, and how the choice may or may not achieve broad goals of efficiency and fairness. We present three case studies: heavy‐duty diesel engines, silica and asbestos, and the tobacco industry's Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). |
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| Keywords: | Regulation by litigation administrative law public choice theory diesel engine industry Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) silicosis |
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