Models of liberty: Berlins's ‘Two Concepts’ |
| |
Authors: | Alan Haworth |
| |
Institution: | Department of Philosophy , The Polytechnic of North London , London, Prince of Wales Road NW5 3LB |
| |
Abstract: | According To Sir Isaiah Berlin; (a) freedom is an essentially ‘negative’ concept; (b) one's freedom can only be limited deliberately, by another person or persons; (c) the impersonal operation of a natural force, such as gravity, cannot be said to limit freedom; (d) the impersonal operation of a market force cannot be said to limit freedom. I argue that all four claims are false and that (b), (c), and (d) are logically incornsistent with (a). There would be less point to inevitably somewhat ‘picky’ exercise were it not for the fact that Berlin's account of freedom exemplifies a well-entrenched and influential orthodoxy. The fact is made particularly apparent by the prominent role played by assumption (d) in defences of the ‘free market’. I go on to discus this. |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|