Vote splitting as insurance against uncertainty |
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Authors: | Soares Bugarin Mauricio |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL, 61820, U.S.A.; and 2. Departamento de Economia, Universidade de Brasilia, Brasilia, DF 70910, Brazil
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Abstract: | The present article offers a rational choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a tool risk-averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature. |
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