Insurance strategic considerations in coalition-oriented systems: A consideration set model approach |
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| Institution: | 1. Karlstad University, Sweden;2. University of Gothenburg, Sweden;1. MZES, University of Mannheim, Germany;2. Department of Political Science, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA;3. Politics, University of Manchester, United Kingdom;1. Department of Political Science, 1000 Faner Drive, Room 3165, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901-4501, United States;2. Texas Tech University, Department of Political Science, Box 41015, Lubbock, TX 79409-1014, United States;1. University of Bayreuth, Universitätsstraße 30, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany;2. University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland;3. CREMA—Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland |
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| Abstract: | During a vote-decision process, citizens elect between some of the parties – not all of them. In this paper, we explore a potential strategic reason to include an additional alternative in the consideration set. Drawing on research from the field of strategic voting, we study incentives to defect to a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold in order to elect a winning coalition (”insurance”). Our argument is that these types of strategic considerations occur already in the campaign, but do not always translate into choice. Using the so-called consideration set model approach (CSM), which focuses on how voters select fewer alternatives among a larger number of parties, we model vote choice over an election campaign using panel data from the Swedish National Election Studies of 2014. In line with our argument, we demonstrate that the insurance strategy was prevalent earlier in the decision-making process, when forming the consideration set. |
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| Keywords: | Strategic Consideration set Coalitions Insurance Small parties |
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