Punishing without rewards? A comprehensive examination of the asymmetry in economic voting |
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Institution: | 1. Rice University, USA;2. Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey;1. Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame, United States;2. United States Naval Academy, United States |
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Abstract: | It has been controversial whether incumbents are punished more for a bad economy than they are rewarded for a good economy due to mixed results from previous studies on one or handful number of countries. This paper makes an empirical contribution to this lingering question by conducting extensive tests on whether this asymmetry hypothesis is a cross-nationally generalizable phenomenon using all currently available modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey from 122 elections in 42 representative democracies between 1996 and 2016, as well as macro-economic indicators and individual-level economic perception. In general, this paper finds little support for the asymmetry hypothesis; although the evidence of such asymmetric economic voting is found in some subpopulations using certain economic indicators, these conditional effects are largely inconsistent, suggesting that it is still safe to assume a linear relationship between economic conditions and support for the incumbent. |
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Keywords: | Economic voting Grievance asymmetry Negativity effect Economic perception |
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