Decision period and Duverger's psychological effect in FPTP elections: Evidence from India |
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| Institution: | 1. Risk Dialogue Foundation, Switzerland;2. University of Zurich, Switzerland;1. School of Political Science, Government, and International Relations, Universidad Del Rosario, Colombia;2. Department of Political Studies, CIDE, Mexico;3. Department of Political Science, Utah State University, USA;4. Department of Political Science, Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil;5. Department of Political Science, Temple University, USA;1. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico;2. Washington University in St. Louis, United States;1. University of Mannheim, A5,6, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany;2. University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstrasse 21, D-96045 Bamberg, Germany |
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| Abstract: | The plurality rule creates incentives that can divert the vote from the third parties. I argue that the process that converts such Duvergerian incentives into the Duvergerian outcomes has a temporal dimension: both strategic and non-strategic voters need time to form and communicate their preferences over candidates. To examine this connection, I capitalize on the institution of phased voting in India. I treat the timing of the district vote as the endpoint of the campaign period in the district and evaluate its effect on the vote for the leaders and the third parties, the third parties’ vote share, and the vote concentration. I find a positive effect of campaign period duration on the extent of the observed strategic behaviors in the district. |
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| Keywords: | Duverger's Law Campaign period FPTP Rolling elections |
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