地方官员的最后任期：沽名抑或逡巡——基于辖区企业经营预算视角的实证考察

地方官员临近退休期时的晋升激励消失，其可能会因此趋于保守，也可能为追求“政声人去后，民意闲谈中”的美好从政声誉而更加积极。为此，选取辖区企业经营预算数据对上述问题进行实证考察。研究发现：在地方官员的最后任职期，辖区企业预算收入增长率提高，预算松弛降低，企业预算完成度降低，且结果仅在非中央企业、政治关联以及法治水平较低的样本中成立；企业提高预算完成度并不会导致下年度获得更多的财政补贴和税收优惠；地方官员最后任期会减少辖区企业通过盈余管理完成预算的行为。文章结论更好地揭示了地方官员最后任期对辖区企业经营预算的影响，为规范临近退休干部制度和管理企业经营预算提供了参考价值。

Last Term of Local Officials: for Reputation or Conservation: an EmpiricalStudy from the Perspective of Operating Budget of Enterprises in the Jurisdiction

When local officials are approaching their retirement period, the incentives for promotion will disappear, and they may become more conservative, or more active in pursuing a good reputation in politics after the political career. To find out the truth, this research used the business budget data of the jurisdiction for an empirical investigation into the issues. The research found that: during the last term of office of local officials, the budget revenue growth of enterprises in the jurisdiction increased, budget slack decreased, and budget completion decreased, the results were only in samples with non central enterprises, political connections, and low levels of the rule of law; Increasing the budget completion degree of enterprises will not lead to more financial subsidies and tax incentives in the next year; In the last term the local officials will reduce the work in their jurisdictions to complete budgets through earnings management.The conclusion of the article better reveals the impact of the last term of local officials work on the operating budgets of enterprises in their jurisdictions, and provides reference for the regulation of the system of retiring cadres and the management of enterprise operating budgets.