Discourse rights and the Drumcree marches: a reply to O'Neill

In a recent BJPIR article Shane O'Neill uses Habermas' discourse theory of rights to argue that the conflicts over marches in Drumcree can be resolved rationally in the nationalist residents' favour. I question this conclusion via a critique of Habermas' theory. Habermas' apparently unexceptionable requirement that political outcomes win universal acceptability is bought at the cost of vagueness: it fails to specify how acceptability is secured, or how the requirement itself is derived. So it cannot justify the exceptions to equal civil rights which O'Neill wants, such as exceptions to rights of freedom of expression or movement. Unionists can claim that their position respects Habermas' universal acceptability requirement. This exposes the limitations of attempts to impose abstract principles such as Habermas' on real political conflicts. A possible alternative to this is a form of Schmittian decisionism, in which rules either prove indeterminate, or are confronted with exceptional cases that call for executive intervention outside the framework of rules. Sensitivity to political context requires not derogations from rights, but respect for the autonomy of political processes.