Just 'Cause You're Smarter than Me Doesn't Give You a Right to Tell Me What to Do: Legitimate Authority and the Normal Justification Thesis

Joseph Raz's famous theory of authority is grounded in threeclaims about the nature and justification of authority. Accordingto the Preemption Thesis, authoritative directives purport toreplace the subject's judgments about what she should do. Accordingto the Dependence Thesis, authoritative directives should bebased on reasons that actually apply to the subjects of thedirective. According to the Normal Justification Thesis (NJT),authority is justified to the extent that subjects are morelikely to comply with right reason by following the authority'sdirectives than by following their own judgments about whatright reason requires.¹ In this article, I consider a number of ways in which NJT mightbe construed as a justification for authority. First, I evaluateNJT construed as a principle that would provide a practicaljustification for an individual to accept or recognize a particularperson or persons as a preemptive authority. Second, I evaluateNJT construed as a principle that describes the conditions underwhich a state or legal system is morally legitimate. I arguethat NJT is true under none of these interpretations.²