Interest group strategies in multi‐level Europe

• This article analyzes the political responses of French and Italian business associations to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the EU. I propose and test the empirical relevance of a multi‐level lobbying model for multi‐tiered systems, a model assumed by, but never systematically examined in, the pluralism literature. Data for this ten‐sector cross‐national panel study come from personal interviews with the presidents of French and Italian business associations. The interviews were held at the beginning and the end of the euro implementation process. The research shows that organized groups routinely overstep their territorial jurisdictions to lobby across multiple levels of government in multi‐level Europe. The degree of state political decentralization is a statistically significant variable in explaining the choice of lobbying target. This ‘crucial comparative case study’ finds that, in adjusting to deeper economic integration, regional associations in France focus their energy on the central government, while Italian groups favour the regional government.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.