Delegative dilemmas and horizontal logics: Subnational industrial policy in Spain and Brazil

Scholars of “decentralization” have recently revealed the importance of subnational industrial policy in responding to the challenges of globalization. But these treatments tend to make endemic assumptions about either the universal efficiency or inefficiency of decentralization. This article argues that subnational industrial policy performance is politically contingent and develops national patterns that are more composite than endemic. Political contingency is analyzed in terms of subnational incumbents' incentives to delegate authority and resources to industrial policy agencies and the degree of symmetry in authority and information flows across these agencies. A cross-regional/cross-national comparison of several subnational units in Spain and Brazil demonstrates that subnational industrial policy is implemented and maintained where incumbents delegate and policy-making agencies are symmetrically integrated. Alfred P. Montero is an assistant professor of Political Science at Carleton College and book review editor forLatin American Politics and Society. His research on subnational political economy is the subject of his forthcoming book,Shifting States in Global Markets: Subnational Industrial Policy in Contemporary Brazil and Spain, Penn State University Press. He has published on the subject of the political economy of decentralization and federalism inComparative Politics, Latin American Politics and Society, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, and numerous edited volumes.