Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring |
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Authors: | Sami Dakhlia Paul Pecorino |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Finance and International Business, The University of Southern Mississippi, 118 College Drive #5072, Hattiesburg, MS, 39406, USA 2. Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, 35487-0224, USA
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Abstract: | In a standard rent-seeking contest, players optimally employ resources in an attempt to obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some exogenous per-unit cost. In practice, these resources often consist of scarce, talented individuals. We model a rent-seeking contest with scarce talent and find that talent scarcity leads to preemptive hiring by the player receiving the larger rent. This player hires all available talent and wins the contest with probability 1. This is true even when the difference in rents is small. |
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