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Participation and voting in committees: Evidence from the ILO
Authors:Bernhard Boockmann
Affiliation:1. Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), P.O. Box 10 34 43, D-68034, Mannheim
Abstract:Although many international organisations are formally built on the principle of ‘one country–one vote’, the lack of representativeness in decision-making may give a subgroup of members disproportionate influence. Using data on participation and voting in 51 decision-making committees of the International Labour Organization (ILO), we do find a bias in voting outcomes due to committee composition. Recent theoretical research has argued that voters with extreme preferences may self-select into committees. A procedure is proposed to test for this prediction. There is no indication that governments with extreme preferences are drawn disproportionately into ILO committees.
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