The political economics of not paying taxes |
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Authors: | Jesper Roine |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83, Stockholm, Sweden
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Abstract: | This paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax avoidance. When tax avoidance is possible, the official tax rate does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay. This affects both redistributive outcomes as well as political attitudes towards taxation. Depending on the avoidance technology different political equilibria emerge. When the avoidance possibilities are limited, the classical conflict between rich and poor is sustained. If the tax avoidance technology is more effective, however, the equilibrium outcome can change to a situation where a coalition of poor and the very richest favor a higher tax rate. Comparing the model predictions with data on income inequality and evidence of avoidance activity, it comes surprisingly close to actual observations. |
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