A comment on Baron and Ferejohn (1989): The Open Rule Equilibrium andCoalition Formation |
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Authors: | David M. Primo |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY, 14627-0146, USA
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Abstract: | I present a more general characterization of the symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium to the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) open rule divide-the-dollar game. Specifically, I show that an amender can follow several different randomization strategies when deciding whom to make offers to, and each can be sustained as a distinct equilibrium with slightly different payoffs. The result demonstrates that, when building coalitions in bargaining settings where an offer is already on the table, those with the worst offers need not be the ones “bought up” first. |
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