A Case Against Crippling Compensation in International Law of State Responsibility |
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| Authors: | Martins Paparinskis |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Reader in Public International Law, University College London. I am grateful to Attila Tanzi for hosting me as the DSG Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Bologna, where this paper was 2. originally 3. researched;4. to 5. the 6. Graduate Institute Geneva, University of Vienna, and 7. Oxford Public International Law Discussion Group for the opportunity to present my work in progress;8. to Christiane Ahlborn, John Crook, Robert Howse, Lise Johnson, Maria Lee, Sergio Puig, Jeremy Sharpe, Ntina Tzouvala, 9. and 10. Meagan Wong 11. for their insightful comments;12. 13. and finally to the journal's anonymous 14. peer reviewers 15. for their constructive criticisms. All URLs last accessed 1 July 2020. |
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| Abstract: | The obligation of States to provide full reparation for internationally wrongful acts, including by full compensation, is one of the bedrock principles of international law. The article challenges this principle for cases where compensation is crippling for the responsible State or its peoples, which can occur when State responsibility is implemented before international courts and tribunals. The International Law Commission's decision not to qualify full reparation for instances of crippling compensation in its influential Articles on State responsibility was an unpersuasive legal position to adopt in 2001, and its rationale has aged badly. However, the failure by States and other actors to challenge it in the following two decades signified its endorsement by the international legal process. Nevertheless, the case against the permissibility of crippling compensation in modern international law can still be made, both on a case-by-case basis and at the level of customary secondary rules of State responsibility. |
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