Measuring Delegation |
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Authors: | Robert L Brown |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA |
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Abstract: | Principal-agent analyses of delegation to international organizations have advanced our understanding of international cooperation
through institutions. However, broader tests of why and when states delegate are not possible without a clear means for objectively
identifying and measuring delegation. This paper develops a metric for delegation based upon the services the agent provides
to its principals and the resources and autonomy it has to provide those services. This numerical metric is continuous and
generalizable to a wide variety of principal-agent relationships. This paper then demonstrates the face validity of the measure
with case studies of delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The paper concludes with a test of Realist and Institutionalist hypotheses for cooperation using the delegation metric, demonstrating
the complexity of the underlying reasons we observe delegation. |
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Keywords: | |
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