Independence Under Fire: Extra-legal Pressures and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement

This study uses detailed quantitative analyses of the completehistory of rulings made by the Panels and the Appellate Bodyof the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism during its first tenyears of operation, to assess the robustness of theories regardingthe decision-making of these institutions. Regression analysesare used to test for correlation between the success of Complainantsin dispute settlement and a variety of factors, representingthe hypothesized capacity of states to influence Panels andthe Appellate Body through dimensions of political and economicpower, the impact of the relative practical capacities of statesin dispute settlement proceedings, and the formation of coalitionsof states in support of a particular Complainant or Respondent.The results of the regression analyses – that few significantcorrelations exist between the independent variables and thedispute outcomes – provide evidence that the judicialinstitutions of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism are independentfrom Member State influence. The one reliable correlation foundin these analyses demonstrates that a Complainant state doeshave substantial advantage in Panel proceedings if it has previouslyparticipated in more disputes than the Respondent.