The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards |
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Authors: | Helland, Eric Tabarrok, Alexander |
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Affiliation: | Eric Helland, Claremont-McKenna College, and Alexander Tabarrok, The Independent Institute and George Mason University |
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Abstract: | We argue that partisan elected judges have an incentive to redistributewealth from out-of-state defendants (nonvoters) to in-stateplaintiffs (voters). We first test the hypothesis by using cross-statedata. We find a significant partisan effect after controllingfor differences in injuries, state incomes, poverty levels,selection effects, and other factors. One difference that appearsdifficult to control for is that each state has its own tortlaw. In cases involving citizens of different states, federaljudges decide disputes by using state law. Using these diversity-of-citizenshipcases, we conclude that differences in awards are caused bydifferences in electoral systems, not by differences in statelaw. |
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