Delegation and Defensive Legislative Strategies in Brazil |
| |
Authors: | SYLVIA GAYLORD |
| |
Institution: | 1. Colorado School of Mines;2. Sylvia Gaylord <3. >4. is Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Division of Liberal Arts and International Studies, Colorado School of Mines, 305 Stratton Hall, Golden, CO 80401. |
| |
Abstract: | In the course of the legislative process, legislators choose how much policy discretion to delegate to the executive branch. Uncertainty about policy outcomes and bureaucratic intentions weighs heavily in such decisions. In Brazil, executive control over the budget creates uncertainty about the availability of discretionary spending, which results in comparatively high levels of delegation in the legislature's direct‐spending decisions. I demonstrate that sidelining the legislature from the budget in order to insulate government spending from political pressures diminishes the value of legislative work in Brazil and reinforces historical patterns of policymaking centered on the federal executive. |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|