Trading Refugees for Land and Symbols: The Palestinian Negotiation Strategy in the Oslo Process

This article analyses the negotiation strategy of the PalestineLiberation Organization regarding the refugee issue in the failedIsraeli–Palestinian peace process from 1993 to 2001. Itis argued that the PLO was on the brink of conceding the ‘rightof return’ for the sake of territorial concessions fromIsrael. The author discusses the implications of this strategyfor the domestic legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership, asgiving up the right of return would violate a core tenet inPalestinian national mythology. The PLO negotiators tried tosolve that dilemma by, first, separating the principle of returnfrom its implementation—making it possible for the PLOto remain committed to the principle, while offering compromiseson physical return—and, second, by demanding symbolicgestures from Israel, including acknowledgment of Israel's historicresponsibility for the refugee problem. It is argued that Israel'srefusal to offer a minimum of face-saving gestures preventedthe PLO from formalizing its compromise proposal.