Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment

The assumption that policies reducing the proliferation of fissile materials will automatically reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is fallacious. Even if moderately successful, anti-proliferation initiatives have a limited impact on the illegal flow of nuclear materials and are not likely to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors. Current policies focus on the containment of fissile materials rather than on non-state-actors that may wish to acquire them. Concentrating principally on management, accounting, storage and transfer procedures, policy-makers seem to ignore the fact that the primary threat of nuclear terrorism stems not from the availability of the materials but from the potential willingness of some groups to acquire them. This article attempts to shift the focus of discussion from state-centric models of analysis to a threat or actor-based model of analysis. In doing so, the article seeks to identify risk factors, which in combination may indicate a willingness by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition it hopes to provide the basis for more effective threat assessments.