| Abstract: | Policies for preventing or mitigating unfavorable economic conditions, such as inflation, balance-of-payments deficits, and recessions are usually determined by successful policies used in the past, but these policies may not be relevant for certain problems in the future due to changes in conditions. In the past, developing countries with balance of payments problems seeking help from the IMF were usually required to reduce their budget deficits, restrict the money supply, and make other macroeconomic restrictions. However, financial crises experienced by the East Asian countries in 1995–1996 arose mainly from declines in their securities markets accompanied by capital exports and sharp currency depreciation. The IMF provided generous assistance conditioned on the recipients' applying restrictive macroeconomic measures, even though there was no inflation or excessive monetary expansion. The cause of the financial crises was primarily capital outflows generated by defaults on loans made by banks largely for real estate projects, and in some cases resulting bank failures. The capital outflow and the sharp depreciation of the currencies, coupled with macroeconomic restrictions, led to recession and unemployment in these countries. The article goes on to discuss the policies the IMF should have promoted. Its credits should have been used to sustain imports rather than to support currencies and maintain debt service repayments. |
