声誉机制对我国社会保障基金投资管理人的激励效应

全国社会保障基金理事会的投资管理地位已经确立,那么它就与其投资管理人形成了委托-代理关系。根据博弈论可知,若企业家只是重视短期利益,不注重其自身的声誉,在短期内可能获得最大化利润,而从中长期看来却不能。若建立有效的投资管理人声誉机制,则可以解决投资管理人个人收益函数与全国社保基金会的利益函数不一致性的问题。在Meyer和Vickers所建立的声誉机制模型的基础上,把声誉机制引入我国的社会保障基金的个人账户投资领域,进一步研究其对我国个人账户基金投资管理人的激励和约束作用,建立了基金投资管理人声誉机制模型,说明了声誉机制对全国社会保障基金理事会在激励投资管理人方面发挥的重要作用,并为更好地发挥该机制作用提出了几点建议。

Research on the Incentive Effect of Prestige Mechanism on Investment Supervisors in NSIFC

The establishment of the National Social Insurance Fund Council (NSIFC) indicates the formation of the principal-agent relationship between the NSIFC and investment supervisors. According to game theory, it is known that if entrepreneurs only take the short-term benefits into considerations, they will not pay much attention to its own prestige. If an effective prestige mechanism for investment supervisors can be established, it is possible to reduce the differentials between the individual revenue function of investment supervisors and the benefit function of NSIFC. Based on Meyer and Vickers' model of prestige mechanism, this article proposes the importance of the prestige in inspiring investment supervisors and then introduces the prestige mechanism model, which manifests the important role of prestige mechanism in encouraging the investment supervisors in NSIFC. Finally, several suggestions are put forward to take full advantages of the prestige mechanism in NSIFC.