What the ICJ did not say about the Duty to Punish Genocide: The Missing Pieces in a Puzzle

The article focuses on the legal implications of the constructionof the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) ofthe duty to punish genocide under Article VI of the Conventionon the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide inthe Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro judgment.It posits that the Court's discussion of the duty to punishis satisfying in terms of what it says and less satisfying interms of what it is silent about. It is satisfying in the sensethat the Court's construction of the duty to cooperate withinternational tribunals prosecuting genocide as including aduty of extradition, seems to extend beyond the plain languageof the Convention and indeed beyond the parties’ originalintent. It is not fully satisfying because the duty to prosecuteremains quite limited. It is further argued that the obligationto punish genocide as established in Article I and the obligationto prosecute genocide as established in Article VI should beunderstood as two distinct obligations. Article VI merely setsthe institutional arrangements for prosecution. Other normativesources support the conclusion that a general duty to prosecuteperpetrators of genocide or extradite them for prosecution elsewhereapplies even in those cases where the offence was not committedin the territory of a contracting state or when the offenderis prosecuted by an international court that has jurisdictionover the state where the alleged perpetrator is found.